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A Game of Old Maid: The Ninth Circuit  
Establishes when the Owner-Operator is Determined 
for CERCLA Liability in California v. Hearthside 
Residential Corp. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ripple effect of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill has extended 
far beyond the coastal regions surrounding it. The massive oil 
hemorrhage in the Gulf of Mexico has stirred up renewed discussion 
among politicians and in the media over Superfund and the 
importance of affixing responsibility to polluters.1 Superfund, or 
more specifically, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),2 was enacted in 1980 
as a response to “the serious environmental and health risks posed by 
industrial pollution” and was intended “to ensure that the costs of 
such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the 
contamination.”3 Those that are liable for the contamination, as a 
result of their relationship to the contamination, are identified as 
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) by the statute. One such PRP 
is the current “owner and operator” of the contaminated location.4 
But unlike the other PRPs, who are assigned liability due to some 
role in causing the contamination, this party’s only reason for being 
“responsible” is ownership of the contaminated site.5 Like the last 
player stuck holding the “Old Maid” in the classic card game,6 the 
 
 1. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, President to Push for Restoration of the Superfund Tax, 
WASH. POST, June 21, 2010, at A5; Shari Shapiro, Deepwater Horizon—A Love Canal 
Moment, CLEANTECHIES (June 2, 2010, 4:30 AM), http://blog.cleantechies.com/ 
2010/06/02/deepwater-horizon-love-canal-moment/ (suggesting that the Gulf spill is akin 
to the disaster that prompted Superfund’s creation). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2006). 
 3. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1874 (2009). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). 
 5. See infra Part III.A. 
 6. Old Maid is a matching game played with a fifty-one card deck, in which players 
take turns drawing cards from the prior player’s hand and then discarding any matching pairs. 
“There is no winner in Old Maid; however, there is a clear loser—the person left holding the 
unmatched card, or the old maid.” Daniel Farr, Old Maid, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLAY IN 
TODAY’S SOCIETY 425, 425 (Rodney P. Carlisle ed., 2009). 
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party holding title to the contaminated site is strictly liable for 
cleanup expenses.7 Unfortunately, CERCLA is unclear regarding the 
point in time at which the “card game” stops and a particular owner-
operator is determined to be liable for cleanup. In other words, 
where ownership to a particular site switches hands over a period of 
time, CERCLA fails to specify which owner-operator is required to 
front cleanup costs. 
In California v. Hearthside Residential Corp., the Ninth Circuit 
addressed whether “owner and operator” liability under CERCLA is 
determined at the time of a cleanup action or at the time a resulting 
suit is filed.8 As a “question of first impression” the court relied 
primarily on what it viewed as “CERCLA’s purposes” to arrive at its 
holding that the current owner and operator, for cleanup liability, is 
set at the time cleanup occurs.9 This Note argues that the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis of this issue inappropriately diverges from the 
Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of CERCLA because the court 
failed to look at the plain meaning of the statute, did not strictly 
apply liability, and should have found the current owner to be 
determined when recovery for incurred cleanup costs are sought. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Hearthside Residential Corporation (“Hearthside”) purchased a 
tract of undeveloped wetlands in Huntington Beach, California in 
1999.10 The tract, known as the Fieldstone Property, sat adjacent to 
several residential plots (“Residential Site”) that were not owned or 
occupied by Hearthside.11 At the time of purchase, Hearthside was 
aware that the Fieldstone Property was contaminated by 
polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs.12 By 2002, Hearthside had 
entered into a consent order with the State of California’s 
 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
 8. 613 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 9. Id. at 911, 914. 
 10. Id. at 911. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. PCBs are a member of the man-made organic chemical family known as 
chlorinated hydrocarbons and were manufactured domestically, beginning in 1929, for use in 
hundreds of industrial and commercial applications. PCBs were banned, however, in 1979 
because of their toxicity. Studies have shown that PCBs cause cancer as well as “other adverse 
health effects on the immune system, reproductive system, nervous system, and endocrine 
system.” Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs): Basic Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
epawaste/hazard/tsd/pcbs/pubs/about.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). 
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Department of Toxic Substance Control (“the Department”) under 
which Hearthside agreed to undertake remediation of the PCB 
contamination of the Fieldstone Property.13 The Department also 
determined that the adjoining Residential Site had been 
contaminated by PCBs as a result of leakage from the Fieldstone 
Property and considered Hearthside responsible for the process of 
investigating and remediating the Residential Site.14 Hearthside 
opposed this determination, asserting that it bore no responsibility 
for the Residential Site and therefore limited its cleanup efforts to 
just the Fieldstone Property.15  
Subsequent to Hearthside’s refusal of responsibility for the PCB 
contamination on the Residential Site, the Department contracted 
cleanup efforts at the Residential Site, incurring ongoing cleanup 
costs between July 2002 and October 2003.16 On December 1, 
2005, the Department certified the completion of the Fieldstone 
Property cleanup and Hearthside promptly sold the Fieldstone 
Property to the California State Lands Commission.17 In October 
2006, the Department filed a suit against Hearthside, seeking 
reimbursement for the costs of the cleanup of the Residential Site.18  
The Department’s complaint relied on two key points. First, the 
Department alleged that the Fieldstone Property was the source of 
the Residential Site contamination.19 Second, Hearthside had 
ownership of the Fieldstone Property at the time of the Residential 
Site’s cleanup.20 According to the Department’s analysis, Hearthside 
was the “owner” of the contamination source at the time of the 
cleanup effort and was therefore responsible for the costs of 
remediation under CERCLA.21 Hearthside disputed the 
Department’s assignment of liability, asserting that “owner” status 
was instead established when the recovery suit was filed, rather than 
at the time of cleanup.22 Hearthside was therefore not responsible for 
 
 13. Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 911. 
 14. Id. at 911–12. 
 15. Id. at 912. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2006).  
 22. Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 912. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 7:55 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
120 
the cleanup costs of the Residential Site because it had sold the 
Fieldstone Property prior to the Department filing suit.23  
The district court, ruling only on the issue of whether 
Hearthside was an “owner and operator” of the Fieldstone Property, 
granted partial summary judgment in the Department’s favor.24 The 
court concluded that determining “owner” status at the time the 
cleanup claim occurs, rather than at the time of the lawsuit, aligns 
with the stated purposes of CERCLA.25 The district court  granted 
the parties’ joint request to certify the question for immediate 
appeal, which the Ninth Circuit agreed to hear.26 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
At issue in this case is the proper date from which to measure 
ownership of contaminated property in order to determine who is a 
PRP. Three areas of background inform an examination of 
California v. Hearthside Residential Corp.: the origins and purpose 
of CERCLA; how the Ninth Circuit has interpreted ambiguity in 
CERCLA prior to Hearthside; and, finally, how the Supreme Court 
has interpreted CERCLA ambiguity, specifically relating to the 
identification of PRPs. 
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act 
CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund,27 causes “those 
responsible for . . . contamination” to be held directly liable in order 
to assure that the cleanup of designated hazardous sites actually 
occurs.28 CERCLA, however, has required numerous clarifications 
and interpretations by courts due to being “hastily assembled.”29 As 
it imposes a strict liability standard,30 a significant amount of the 
contested ambiguity revolves around the four PRPs identified in the 
 
 23. Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. The name “Superfund” comes from the statute’s creation of a trust fund called the 
“Hazardous Substances Superfund.”  26 U.S.C. § 9507(a) (2006). 
 28. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1874 (2009). 
 29. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 885 nn.13–14 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 30. See infra Part III.C. 
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statute:31 1) the owner and operator of a property, 2) any person 
who owned a contaminated property at the time of contamination, 
3) any person who arranged for transportation, disposal, or 
treatment of hazardous substances by any other party, and 4) any 
person who accepts hazardous substances for transportation to 
disposal or treatment.32 Under CERCLA, an entity that qualifies as 
one of these four types of PRPs “shall be liable for all costs of 
removal or remediation incurred” at the contamination site.33 
B. The Importance of Plain and Ordinary Meaning in Interpreting 
CERCLA  
In its most recent examination of CERCLA, Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Shell Oil Corp., the Supreme 
Court was tasked with providing clarity to ambiguous terminology in 
CERCLA.34 At issue in Burlington was whether Shell Oil qualified as 
a party that “arranged for disposal” of contaminating material; if so, 
it would be liable for cleanup as a PRP.35 Justice Stevens, writing for 
the majority, stated that, in determining PRP liability, the Court first 
looks to the language of the statute.36 But where the statutory 
definitions of CERCLA fail to provide sufficient specificity, the 
Court must “give the phrase its ordinary meaning.”37 In other 
words, the Court will use “common parlance,” or the meaning of 
the words as found in a dictionary.38 The Court then draws upon this 
meaning as the “plain language of the statute.”39 
This was not the first time the Court utilized the concept of plain 
language or common usage to interpret CERCLA. In United States 
v. Atlantic Research Corp., the Court relied on the “plain language” 
of CERCLA when interpreting the phrase “any other person” to 
mean that any private party—including another PRP—is authorized 
 
 31. See Burlington, 129 S. Ct. 1870; United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4) (2006). 
 33. Id. § 9607(a)(4). 
 34. 129 S. Ct. at 1878. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1879. 
 38. Id. The Court in Burlington actually derived its interpretation from Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, citing to it directly. 
 39. Id. 
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to commence cost-recovery actions.40 Similarly, in Cooper Industries, 
Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., the Court used the concept of “natural 
meaning” to interpret the use of “may” in CERCLA’s enabling 
clause to authorize contributions to cleanup costs only in specific 
circumstances, based upon the context of the language as read in 
that sentence of the statute.41 Perhaps even more demonstrative of 
the Court’s willingness to focus on plain meaning was its 
interpretation of direct liability in United States v. Bestfoods.42 In 
Bestfoods, the Court not only used the “plain language” of CERCLA 
to indicate that a parent company is strictly liable for operating a 
polluting facility but also again relied upon a dictionary definition—
this time for the word “operate”—to establish an ambiguous term’s 
“ordinary meaning.”43 
Admittedly, while these cases do not constitute an exhaustive 
treatment of the Court’s use of plain or ordinary language to 
interpret CERCLA, they nevertheless make it apparent that the 
Court considers using the language of the statute—even when it is 
simply stating what a common reading suggests—vital to resolving 
ambiguity in CERCLA language.44 
C. The Strict Liability Foundation in CERCLA 
Strict liability “does not depend on actual negligence or intent to 
harm,”45 and in fact the Court has suggested that “knowledge of the 
facts [is] unnecessary.”46 Therefore, strict liability “maximizes 
deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties” by establishing liability 
based on bright-line conditions.47 For environmental contamination, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “CERCLA imposes 
strict liability.”48 This strict liability standard relies upon “the seminal 
 
 40. 551 U.S. 128, 136 (2007). 
 41. 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004). 
 42. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
 43. Id. at 65–67. 
 44. See also Meghrig v. KFC W. Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996) (using “plain 
reading”); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994) (using “plain 
terms”). 
 45. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009). 
 46. United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971). 
 47. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002) (citing Pac. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14 (1991)). 
 48. E.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878 
(2009). 
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opinion” of Chief Judge Carl Rubin in United States v. Chem-Dyne 
Corp.,49 in which the Court found support for strict liability in the 
history of CERCLA.50 While it is undisputed—both from historical 
interpretation and recent Court discussion—that CERCLA imposes 
strict liability, it is important to keep this background principle of 
efficient enforcement in mind since it is a motivating factor for 
imposing strict liability in the first place. 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
In California v. Hearthside Residential Corp., the Ninth Circuit 
set out to identify the time at which the current owner-operator is 
determined under CERCLA.51 In reaching its decision on this issue, 
which was a question of first impression, the court proceeded to use 
three elements to frame its holding: 1) the language of CERCLA, 2) 
the context of CERCLA liability, and 3) the purposes for CERCLA’s 
creation. The court concluded by dismissing concern over the factual 
determinations required by its decision. 
A. CERCLA’s Language 
After distinguishing Hearthside from other circuit court 
discussions of ownership, the court identified the central issue as 
simply determining the time at which a PRP becomes “the owner or 
operator of a vessel or a facility.”52 Although not expressly stated in 
CERCLA, the court interpreted this to mean the “current” owner or 
operator of the contaminating location.53 The court noted, however, 
that the definition of owner and operator is silent on the point in 
time at which “current” ownership is determined.54 This absence of 
clarity in the “plain text” of CERCLA required the court to look 
beyond the plain language and use the statutory context and 
purposes of CERCLA.55 The court reasoned that utilizing these 
 
 49. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).  
 50. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1880–81. 
 51. 613 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 52. Id. at 910; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2006). 
 53. Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 912–13 (citing Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 
270 Fed 863, 881 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)); accord, e.g., United States v. Capital Tax Corp., 
545 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008); ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 456 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
 54. Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 913. 
 55. Id. at 914. 
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elements of CERCLA would best illuminate how Congress intended 
the determination of ownership to be measured when the language 
of the statute is not plain.56  
B. CERCLA’s Context 
The court’s analysis of CERCLA’s context was largely based on a 
review of those provisions related to imposition of liability under the 
statute—specifically, the statute of limitations incorporated in 
CERCLA.57 The court found it reasonable to assume that it was 
Congress’s intent to have the statute of limitations run against the 
owner of the property when cleanup occurred in order to protect 
against stale claims.58 The court hypothesized that a well-timed 
transfer of a cleaned property to an “innocent owner” could 
undermine the aim of providing notice and predictability to a 
defendant.59 The court took this view of the statute of limitations as 
strong contextual evidence that Congress intended the “current 
owner” to be the owner at the time of the cleanup effort.60  
C. CERCLA’s Purposes 
In the second prong of the court’s analysis, the court found that 
an examination of the purposes of CERCLA produced the same 
results as the court’s review of the statute’s context.61 The court 
delineated the purposes of CERCLA into two components: 1) to 
encourage responsible parties to remediate hazardous facilities 
without delay and 2) to encourage early settlement between PRPs 
and environmental regulators.62 
1. CERCLA encourages PRPs to remediate without delay 
This policy of incentivizing timely action, according to the court, 
suggests that a landowner should be given no reason to delay 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 914–15. In the court’s hypothetical example, a recently cleaned property 
could be sold to an innocent owner one day before the statute of limitations runs out and, as a 
result, this “new” innocent owner would bear full liability for cleanup under CERCLA for any 
timely recovery action that is later filed. Id. 
 60. Id. at 915. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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completion of cleanup—accomplished by attaching ownership 
liability for recovery costs during the cleanup action.63 Conversely, 
the court suggested that under Hearthside’s theory a property owner 
could attempt to dodge liability by delaying cleanup completion 
until he or she could arrange a transfer of the land to a new owner.64 
This is particularly likely when a recovery suit will be filed once the 
cleanup is complete and the actual total cost is calculated. Therefore, 
the court reasoned that because an owner might employ any manner 
of “contrived delay” as a means to secure a buyer—and thereby 
transfer liability—before the suit is filed, ownership must be 
determined based on when cleanup costs are incurred rather than the 
filing of the suit.65 
2. CERCLA encourages early settlement between PRPs and regulators  
The court found that Hearthside’s argument—that current 
ownership be determined at the time of the suit—is weakened by the 
importance of settling in CERCLA on two counts.66 First, if 
ownership is measured at the time the lawsuit is filed, then a lawsuit 
must be filed for every recovery action, and any rule that would 
create a lawsuit in every instance “is the opposite outcome that 
CERCLA seeks to promote.”67 Secondly, an “agreed remedial action 
plan” is central to CERCLA settlement, and the owner at the time of 
cleanup is thereby included in the technical consulting process—
selecting from among the alternatives the scope of the cleanup.68 The 
court reasoned that, because of CERCLA’s attempts to include the 
owner during cleanup in the process, current ownership should be 
set at the time cleanup occurs.69 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. CERCLA has been interpreted by the Ninth Circuit as emphasizing early 
settlement on several occasions. See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 
880 (9th Cir. 2001); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 948 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 67. Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 915. 
 68. Id. 
 69.  Id. at 916. 
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D. Factual Determination 
The last portion of the court’s decision was concerned with 
Hearthside’s assertion that the lawsuit-filing date would create “a 
simple and clear date from which to measure” ownership.70 The 
court agreed that measuring ownership from the time of cleanup 
would, in some cases, necessitate factual determinations to determine 
“current ownership.”71 Nevertheless, the court was not persuaded 
that the “limited factfinding” required to determine ownership was 
sufficiently burdensome so as to necessitate a different holding by 
the court.72 Factual questions regarding cleanup dates are 
commonplace in CERCLA actions, and the courts are “well 
equipped” to resolve such issues.73 Therefore, in view of its weighty 
consideration of CERCLA’s context and purposes, the court held 
that current ownership for purposes of liability is to be measured 
from the time of cleanup.74 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly analyzed the issue of owner-
operator determination under CERCLA in California v. Hearthside 
Residential Corp. by failing to give proper deference to plain 
meaning and strict liability in the examination of language, context, 
purposes, and factual determinations under CERCLA. 
A. CERCLA’s Language 
The court’s holding that § 9607(a)(1) refers to the “current” 
owner-operator of the contaminated site is the most logical 
interpretation of the statute’s language. However, the court should 
have reviewed the language of the statute more thoroughly in its 
analysis. Instead of examining the “plain meaning” of the terms 
“owner and operator” and “current” in the context of timing, the 
court was quick to claim a lack of clarity and move to the intent and 
purposes of CERCLA. Proper analysis of liability under CERCLA 
must “begin with the language of the statute.”75 This is not to say 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878 (2009). 
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that the Ninth Circuit should have looked solely to the language, 
but rather that the statutory language must be carefully examined for 
the court’s analysis to be complete and proper. 
The “owner” of a piece of land is commonly understood to be 
the person holding title to it. Moreover, the definition of “own”—
“owner” being one who owns76—is “to have or hold as property.”77 
Thus, both the plain meaning and the dictionary definition of owner 
denote that to be an owner, a person must possess or hold title to 
property. An individual who sells his property today was an owner 
yesterday, but will not be tomorrow. Although the court suggests 
that it is merely the timing behind the term that is ambiguous, it is 
undisputable that the very meaning of the term “owner” is tied up 
with timing. Therefore, it is not a question about when liability 
attaches, but rather a question of when § 9607(a) is called upon to 
establish liability. When § 9607(a) is invoked, the plain language of 
CERCLA clearly considers the person holding title at that moment 
to be the “owner and operator” for liability purposes. 
B. CERCLA’s Context 
The Ninth Circuit’s contextual analysis was limited to the statute 
of limitations, examining both when the timing starts and the 
protection it provides to PRPs. Congress’s activation of the statute of 
limitations at the completion of removal and the initiation of 
remediation is not “strong contextual evidence” as the court 
suggests,78 but simply the most logical point in time. Before 
remediation or removal, there has been no action taken, so it would 
not be reasonable to start the clock for the statute of limitations. 
Moreover, along the timeline of cleanup and recovery, the only other 
point in time to activate the statute of limitations would be when 
recovery is actually sought, most likely by filing a suit. Using cleanup 
as the trigger is not indicative of Congress’s intent, but simply the 
only practical option in that context.  
Beyond the statute of limitations provision in CERCLA, the 
calculation for the accrual of interest in the statute also provides 
some contextual insight. CERCLA states in relevant part that 
 
 76. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1612 (1986). “Own” is the 
verb implicated by the noun “owner.” Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 915. 
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interest on cleanup costs accrues “from the later of” the date the 
costs are incurred or the date a specific amount is demanded in 
writing.79 This seems to indicate that the determination and 
attribution of liability under CERCLA is invoked by formal 
notification of intent to recover cleanup costs. 
The court implied that CERCLA liability is frozen in time as 
soon as cleanup commences. However, this is inconsistent within 
CERCLA as initiation of remediation, completion of removal, and 
written notification requesting recovery are all different points in the 
timeline of CERCLA actions. 
C. CERCLA’s Purposes 
1. CERCLA encourages PRPs to remediate without delay 
The court believed that an owner would delay cleanup efforts in 
order to transfer the property before a suit is filed. However, in order 
for an owner to effectively delay remediation or removal, that owner 
would need to be in charge of those cleanup efforts—much like 
Hearthside’s efforts to cleanup the Fieldstone Property.80 But there 
will never be a suit filed for the cleanup costs resulting from the 
owner’s efforts because that would result in the owner suing himself. 
Instead, it is a third party, like the Department in Hearthside, who 
sues to recover costs of the cleanup it coordinated either on or in 
connection with the owner’s land.  
Not only is it unlikely that an owner would be able to effectively 
delay a cleanup performed by other parties, it is possible that if 
liability is not determined until recovery is sought, owners will 
remediate faster. For example, Hearthside acted timely to remediate 
the contamination of PCBs on its own property and then quickly 
sold the property within weeks of having the cleanup certified. There 
would be no incentive for an owner to act quickly—to remediate, 
certify cleanup, and pass the “old maid” card of ownership—when 
liability will potentially follow him for six or more years. It would be 
better to sit on the property and hope that the land increases in value 
enough to offset the eventual cost of liability. However, by 
determining ownership when recovery is sought, the owner during 
any point of the cleanup is able to move on and assign liability for 
 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
 80. See Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 911–12. 
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the contaminated site. Future buyers would also benefit, as they 
would receive cleaned lands, and the liability that follows “current 
ownership” is a bargaining chip that would allow for deeply 
discounted lands. Using the commencement of actions to recover 
costs as the determining point in time—rather than the 
commencement of cleanup—comports with CERCLA’s purpose of 
encouraging remediation without delay as well. 
2. CERCLA encourages early settlement between PRPs and 
environmental regulators 
The court presumed that if the time of filing is the key to 
defining “current ownership,” such a standard would require 
lawsuits for every recovery action, which would run counter to 
CERCLA’s purpose of encouraging early and efficient settlement. 
The court was correct that a scheme that uses such a standard for 
determining ownership is inappropriate because it would be too 
narrow. It would be more accurate and fitting to describe the 
determining point in time to be when notice is given that recovery of 
costs are being sought. This then includes the actual filing of a 
lawsuit, agency orders requesting recovery, and even the sending of a 
letter requesting repayment for costs incurred. When the total costs 
incurred are known and repayment is sought, liability should attach. 
With such a clear request presented, the “current owner” at that 
time can easily settle or pursue litigation. This would then fulfill the 
purposes behind the statute of limitations, accrual of interest, and 
early settlement. 
The court also stated that because the owner during cleanup can 
“influence” the remediation program, he should be the one 
responsible for the costs of that program.81 However, Hearthside 
suggests a counterexample to the court’s reasoning—where the 
owner denies responsibility, and so the government proceeds to 
unilaterally contract the cleanup.82 Again the court seems to mix 
cleanup actions undertaken by the owner with actions by the 
government, which later seeks recovery of expenses. While the owner 
during cleanup could be involved in the scope and measures taken to 
remediate, the obvious possibility that recoverable cleanup can occur 
without any input from the owner demonstrates that using this as a 
 
 81. Id. at 915–16.  
 82. Id. at 912. 
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standard for supporting cleanup as a determining factor for 
ownership is unsuitable. 
D. Factual Determination 
The court’s rejection of “a simple and clear date from which to 
measure” seems out of place in the context of CERCLA’s strict 
liability standard.83 This is especially true when the court does not 
dispute that calculating ownership at cleanup can necessitate factual 
determinations to determine “current ownership.”84 Requiring a 
court to sort out facts also requires filing a suit for every claim and 
actually discourages early settlement. By determining current 
ownership at the time of recovery, CERCLA “maximizes deterrence 
and eases enforcement difficulties”85 by reducing the need for even 
limited fact-finding.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Hearthside, the Ninth Circuit failed to look at the plain 
meaning of the language used in the statute, did not strictly apply 
liability, and should have found the current owner to be determined 
when recovery for incurred cleanup costs are sought, not when 
cleanup happens. Like stopping a game of Old Maid when people 
still have cards in their hand, determining liability during cleanup 
prematurely stops the process before any of the parties involved are 
actually ready to look at liability and settle up. 
Dustin M. Glazier 
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